Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies
Volume 7

Article 4

4-1-1989

The "Primacy" of the First Amendment: Does It Have a
Justification in Natural Law, History, and Democracy?
James G. McLaren

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma

Recommended Citation
McLaren, James G. (1989) "The "Primacy" of the First Amendment: Does It Have a Justification in Natural
Law, History, and Democracy?," Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies: Vol. 7 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/sigma/vol7/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Sigma: Journal of Political and International Studies by an authorized editor of BYU
ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

TIII~

"PIUMACY"OF TIII~ I"IRS,),
AMENDMENT: DOES IT lIAVE
A JUSTIFICATION IN
NATURAL LAW, HISTORY,
AND DI~MOCRACY?
.James U, McLaren

.J ustice Cardozo has charaderizcd the protedion
of speech as a "fundamental" liberty in part because
"our history, political and h·gal," recognized "freedom
of thoughl and speedl" as "til!! indispensable
l~cmdilion of nearly every other lilrm of freedom"
(Gunthel' I HH5, !17 5),
This essay will examine whether or nol .Justice
Cardozo is correcl.
Is freedom of speech a
fundamental liberty and a prerequisite to otlll'r
freedoms'!
Is it necessary tAl the maintenance of
fl'ee democratic government:! If the answer to these
<Iueslions is in the affirmat.ive, then which one
govel'ns our development of the civil libert.y of free
speech?
Il must be recognized that. a tension exisls
between the slat.e and the individual when
attempling lo posil the genesis of frce speech in
America:
As wc cont.rast t.he right.s of the
individual to speak his piece during t.he Vielnam
War wilh those of his World War One count.erpart,
we notice a movement. in favor of lhe idea lhal
individual freedom is curt.ailed if we deny freedom
of expression; lhat an individual can only experience
the tolalit.y of his olher liberties through the Slate's
recognition of his right of free expression,
\I' this
view is accept.ed, t.he conclusion Illust be t.hat this
"fundamentalily" of right. has it.s origin in nat.ural
expression, nol tied to the State or its instit.ut.ions,
and only susn~Jltihlc to curtailment lInder the mosl
extnlOnlinary cirl'ulllstam'l's,
On Uw other hand, we may posit as the origin
of a righl of fn'l' ex pression t.he Ill'('l'ssity of free
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speech t.o opell, democratic gOVt~rlllllelll. This admit.s
of restraints Oil free speech in order to protect the
dellloCl'atic illstitutiolls which the fret'dolll of speech
is int.ellded to fosler.
III order t.o dct.ermine which or t.hese t.W() geneses
is "csponsible for our First. Amendment freedom of
speech, I shall examinc thc hist.ory of frecdom of
speech in Israel, Athens, Rome, and England.
I
shall then trat:e t.he possible derivation of freedom
of speech from natural la w, to determine whet.her
01' not there is a connection.
Based upon my
findings, I shall condude by analyzing the "special
treatment" or "p.-imacy" or "fundamentality" uf the
f"eedom of speech.
Is it based on historical
precedent, philosophically moted in natural law, or
a man-made invention of a twent.ieth century liberal
judiciary'?

FREE SPEECH UNDER
JEWISH LAW
In Ancient ,Jewish Law we deal with essentially
a t.heocratic legacy, since the Mosaic law was
wrillen down and prcservcd, whereas the secular
Icgislation of kings such as Manassah, David, and
Solomon is all but lost to history (Uorowitz 195:l,
20). Though t.he kings we."e supposed tH be subject
to t.he aut.horit.y of the Torah, t.he activity of kings
t.cnded 1.0 displace and weaken t.hat. authority rather
than enhance it (liorowitz I H5:1, 2 \).
In biblical law thcrefore, there is no democrat.ic
tradition, or movement toward liberty of spccch to
prot.ect democrat.ic inslitutiolls. Inslead, laws against
open expression sought to prot.cct Israel from bdng
drawn away to idolatry.
Since idolat.ry was
regarded as rebellion against nod, all Israel might
lill"leit the blessings of' God if' it allowed a city to
lUi'll to idolatry.
Thus ir a cit.y "ralls away by a
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whole it shall he invest.igated and called upon to
repent."
I r the cit.iwns will not repent then all
Israel will "ali,ack them by force of arms." Wives
and children will be slain by the sword, while those
who seduced them will be stoned (llol'Owitz 1!l5:1,
178).
The offense of idolatry posed such a threat to
Israel that it was the only offense in Talmudic Law
in which evidence obtained by entrapment was
admissible (Horowitz 1!l5:!, 17H).
Strict penalties
also met "idolatrous prophets" and "false prophets."
Those prophesying in the name of an idol could be
summarily strangled, "even if his statement coincided
with the law." lie who prophesied in the name of
the law, but falsely, must be tried by the Court of
Sevent.y-One, the Supreme Court of Israel. I~ven if
the pmphesy were true, if t.he prophet did not.
personally receive it by prophetic revelation he was
strangled (Horowitz 1nfi:l, 17!)-80) .
•Jews we.-e not allowed to curse t.he deaf or blind
(liorowitz 195:1, 1 10).
They were not allowed Lo
"cause the face of their neighbor t.o blm;h" (llorowitz
lH5a, 1 10). The prohibit.ion of injurious gossip and
slandenms defamation arose from t.he commandment
to "love thy neighbor as thyself," (Lev. l!l: 17- 18)
(Horowitz 1!l5a, 120). I~ven if the other party was
guilty of an offense, the Rabbi should be told
p.-ivately so t.hat lhe offender had a chance lo
repent p,·ivatcly.
Insulting one's wire in public was a crime in
Israel and was grounds for divorce (Horowitz 105:1,
258). Spreading an evil report. in order t.o injlll·e a
I'eputalion was punishable by a fine and damages.
Siandea· would not be f(u'givcn unlil apology had
been made.
There was also an offcnse of
humiliation, t:hargeable t.o t.hose who had "done some
act directly on the hody of the (:omplain:lnt," like
spit.t.ing on him or heating him (llorowitz t !15:1, 5!lH(iOO).
Though this offt'nse is more
in 10 OUl'
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modern battery, it was regarded in Israel much like
defamation
and
insult;
an
offcnse
to
the
commandment to love thy neighbor.

FREEDOM Olf' SPEECH IN
ANCIENT ATHENS
The 'irst known use of lhe word "freedom" O(~CUlOs
in a twent.y-filllrth cent.ury BoCo manusnipt. in which
King Urukagina of Lagash issued decrees proclaiming
the f,oeedom of his citizen-subjects (Muller 1961, 404 I).
There is no ment.ion of freedom of speech,
however.
Freedom of speech is said to have been
bonl much later, during the At.henian archaic period
ROO-600 B.C. (Tedford 1985, 4). During this pm"iod,
t.he aristocratic rulers of Athens allowed free
communication of opinions without fear to "cert.ain
classes of citizens."
An expansion of the right
occulTed under the reforms of Solon (c. 5!)4 B.C.)
and Cleisthenes (c. 50n B.c.), reaching a zenith
duroing the golden age under Pericles (c. 44:1-429
B.C.) (Tedford 1n85, 4).
At.henian citizens had wide-ranging freedom of
expression, from the governmental institutions of the
council assembly and courts, to socil,ty at. large.
Max Radin notes t.he extent. of artistic lihert.y
permitted in At.hens by recount.ing the works of
Aristophanes. This dramatist niticizcd the Athenian
politician Cleonymus as a "glutton", "perjurcr",
"in'i)rmer", "swindler", and "onc who t.hrows away
his shield in Laltle" (I !127, ~n:~-2,1).
Calling
someone a "shield throwcr" or coward was
dcfamation undcr A thcnian la w, but the n'sponse to
the insult is not known (Tcdliuod I !IHf), 4).
Although AthcllH was rcput.cd by Plat.o to bc the
city with "Ihe greatpsl lilH'rly of spcech in all
Orcecc" «Jcorgias), then' w('n' restrictions .. pon
speakcrs, content, and the tilllc and place III'

FIRST AMENDMENT
uUerance. As Radin observes, there never was "a
community in which a man might say whatever he
pleased.
"~ven those who at various times have
pleaded f(lr great fn~edol1l of uUerance, have always
hastened 1,0 add qualifit'ations" (1927, 2(5).
Freedom of speech was at lirst narrowly conlined
to a few, then extended in accordance with the
numbers of citizens who had a say in government.
Before Solon, landowners were eligible as citizens,
and could speak with freedom in the assembly.
When the Athenian constitution was reltmned in 54U
B.C., all classes of citizens including non-landowners
were pennitted to participate in the assembly. With
this
extension of enfranchisement carne the
concomitant extension of a right to free speech.
Nevel·theless, the designation "citizen" excluded sixty
percent of the population who were males under
eighteen, women, resident aliens, or slaves (Tedford
1985, 5).
The Athenians had measures of "prior restraint"
to prevent unworthy orators fmm padkipating in
public life. If they had been convicted of a <Time,
did not pay t.heir t.axes, or were accliseu of
dishonorable ads t.IIl'Y could not. speak to audiences
(Tedford 1985, 5).
Siandet· laws providl'd lor lines of t.hose who
spoke evil of the dead, or slandered the living
dUl'ing festivals, in h.'mples, in court.s of law, or in
public onices (IJonner I HH 7, 81-84).
1,;1 ws also
existed t,o punish t.hose who deceived t he people,
gave bad advil-e, or pmmoted inexpedient or
unconstitutional legislation."
The "bad advice"
mentioned above was meant in the context of
misleading an audience aftl'r being hrihed hy an
(\nemy. In esscm'l' it aded much like till' I'~spi()nage
Ad of 1H 17.
(llll' colony in (~rel'('e was so
protedive of its democracy and const.it.ution that:
The original code of laws . . .
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contained a provi:.;ion to prevent tampering
with the law:.;, namely that the person wishing
to propose an amendment. or an existing law
must speak with his head in a noose; if he or
she failed to convince, the noose was tightened
instantly and t.he complainant was strangled
(Freeman 1!)50, :~5).
Despite
the
legal
rcstrict.ions,
freedom
of
cxpression still flourished because it was necessary
to protect. the democracy which the Athenians
treasured.
As Hobert Bonner stat.es, "no laws or
penalties could have fully enfill"Ced responsibility for
public utlerances . . . . Popular government would
have languished and failed if every citizcn stood in
dangel" of the law every time he ventured to speak
in public" (Bonner I!Hi7, 84). One who did flaunt.
the warnings of his legislalors Wits Socral.cs, who
was (unjustly) put. to death for sedition in :HHl B.C.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN
THE ROMAN REPUBLIC
The free and responsible cit.izen in Rome, to
whom the assembly was open, posscsscd certain
rights which the stal.c could prolect. as long as the
citizen cxerciscd CIVIC rcsponsibility.
Romans
believcd in social rcsponsibility and obeying the law,
and therefore toleral.cd a highcr dcgl"ce of stal.c
control ovcr thcir livcs than Athcnians (Momigliano
IH42, 124).

Thcl"c wcre no legal guarant.ccs of frccdom of
spcech; howcvcr, a tradition of 1~llerancc dcveloped
during the Rcpublic that pcrmitted a high degrec of
fl"ee cxprcssioll by thc population. Laura Robinson
flOl.cs that wrilen; of satirical vcrse, poets,
pamphlcu!crs, and hisUII"ians suff"crcd no state
ccnsOl"ship (I~HO)"

1
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AIUwugh the assemhly was open to all citizens,
they only had the right to vote and not to speak.
Senators were called upon to speak (and influence
the vol.m's) in order of rank.
Therefore, although
their speech was proteded, Sl'nators of low rank
were seldom allowed tAl speak (Tedford 1!IHIi, !I).
Senat'(II's could defamc without much fear of legal
aclion. Cicero called PisH a "plague", "Least", "dog
of Clodius" and a "donkey", I'~ven in the {:ourts it
was pennitted to call the defendant a "parricide",
"lover of his sister", and "desecrator of religious
ceremonies" (Robinson 1H40, :n).
Roman legal restrictions upon freedom of speech
were most prcvalent in the slate-run theater.
It
was not pel'miUed tAl insult a person Ly name on
the stage.
The issue of freedom of speech in a
state supported enterprise remains with us tAlday.
As Tedford notes, one argument to support North
Carolina's 1~Hi:l "Speaker-Ban Law" was that
"known communists" could exercise their freedom of
speech in society at large, Lut tax-supported schools
need not provide them with a platform (Tedford
1985, 11).

FREEDOM OF SPEECH
IN ENGLAND
A pattern of "dbsent Ly permission" was
estaLlished Ly the Roman emperors who exhibited
various levels of toleration of crit.icism. This pattern
"became accept.ed pradiee throughout. Europe ,tnd the
British rsles for more t.han sevent.een centuries,
during which time no Wt~stern nation extended to its
citizens a legal guarantee of freedom of t~xpressi(ln"
(Tedford 1!l8:', 12).
The established Christian
church, having won its battle against. persecution by
the authorities, made full use of this lack of legal
protection by persl't'ut ing ot hers whom it deemed
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unorthodox 01' herelical (Pfi.,ni.~r I !}(j 7, 10- 20).
I n the thirteent.h l~t'nl ury, as I he Inquisition bt·gan
on t.he Continent., t.he Magna Carla was Leing signed
in I~ngland.
Though it mnlains II(} ment.ion of
freedolTl of speech. it laid the fiHlIldalion of
constit.ut.ional libert.y "by dedaring that just.ke was
not. t.o be sold, denied, 01' delayed and that no
freeman could be deprived of life or proJlerty except
by peel' judgment and by t.he law of the land"
(Tedrord I nR5, 12).
Tedf()I'd argues that it was
subsequent I'eaflinnat.ions or t.he Magna Carta which
gave rise to a freedom or speech.
No direct line
of free speedl theory passed from Athens and Rome
t.o England (I UR5, 12).
Freedom of specch evolved in England into a dr,i/
liberty.
This involves legal guarant.ees t.hat. each
citizen must be protected by law from arbitrary
arrest. and imprisonment, and t.hat. the law must
support each citi;wn's right I~' speak and not just
a privileged few (Tedford I nR5, 12).
Arbitrary
arn~st or outspoken crit.ks has becn abhorred in
England ancl Ihe Unil~'d Stales, and our crit.ics are
pl'Otected by writ of habeas corpus.
The law
protecting rreedom of speech spread slowly in
England fmm the monarch and high clergy In the
members of parliament in lhe I fiR!) English Bill or
Hight.s, and finally I~, t.he gellt'ral populat.ion as a
civil liberty in the IRHOs (Tcdfiml I!)R!), 1:1-14).
The English adopted legal constraint.s over t.hree
t.ypes or speech: sedit.ion, defamation. and blasphemy
(BlacksUlIlc 17(i!), 151).
Unlike the Greeks, the
I~nglish ext.ended blasphemy U, covel' "immoral" and
"lewd" messages under t.he lahel "oLscene libel"
(Tedf<ml ) BR5, ) 4-15). The reason the rree speech
tJ'adition did not pass unfettered int.o I~nglish society
may Le attributcd U, thc undcmocrat.ic nature or the
government of I~ng'and, even in t.he cent.uries
fi,lIowing Magna Cart.a. The "crimc" of nit.idzing
the King, govcl"nment oHicials, laws, symbols, 01'
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policies w'as punishable as sedit.ious libel under
statutes of 1275 and 1:nn (Levy I !Hi:l, 7), These
laws I'estricted the publication of views critical to
government ft)l' the next. six hundred years,
To cont.-ol seditious libel, the monarchs established
t.he Privy Council and St.ar' Chamber, infamous for
its tor'ture-drawn {~onfessions and executions wit.hout
tl'ial. The public alienat.ion these practices amused
caused Parliament. t.o aholish the St.ar Chamber in
1ti4 I (Tedf(lJ'{j I m~5, I (j).
Suppression
of political
crit.icism continued
however.
The rationale was explained in a 1704
sedition trial by Chief .Justice lIolt, who argued that
if speakers and writers "should not be called to
account for possessing the people with an ill-opinion
of the govenlment., no government can subsist. 1<'01'
it is very necessary for all govenUllents that the
people should have a good opinion of it" (Levy
1963, 10), This rationale came after the relaxation
of licensing of the press, which had persisted in
England from 1538 to UW4, This means of pl'ior
r'estr'aint was the alter'native, and companion to,
seditious libel as a means of controlling fr'ee political
expr'ession, Much of the debate about t.he Framers'
ol'iginal intent revolves around prior restraints and
seditious libel.

THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICA
Leonard W. Levy has said thaI. the
persistent. image of Colonial America as a
sodety in which freedom of expression was
cherished is an hallucinat.ion of sl'nt.in1l'nt t.hat.
ignores hist.ory, , "
Till' AIllcrican people
simply did not. IIndl'rsland that. frecdom of
t.hought. and expr('ssion nwans ('IIIIal frcedorn

7·.

PI SIGMA ALPHA REVIEW

for the other fellow, espet.:ially the one with
hated ideas (I !Hi:i, I H).
Among those helping t~) perpet.uate the myth include
.J ustices Brandeis and lIolmes. J ust.ice Bra;ldeis said
in Whit"e),:
Those who won our independence . . . believed
t.hat. freedom t.o think as you will and to speak
as you t.hink are means indispensable to the
discovery and spread of political truth, that
without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile (I H27, 375).

Justice lIolmes interpreted "the theOl·y of our
constitution" as belief "that the ultimate good desired
is belte.· reached by a free trade in ideas--that the
best test of trut.h is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market and
that truth is the only gnHl/ld upon which their
wishes safely can be carried Olil" (Abmms II. United
Stutes 1HI H, n:H)).
One way to reconcile these opposing camps is to
treat the I"ounding Fathers and the society in which
they lived as separate entities.
The I"ounding
J"athers were exceptional men of high ideals and
refined thinking.
It was WashingulIl who had t.o
convince the populace that "toleration" of other
religious groups meant "acceptance;" toleration was
more than refraining from hanging the other fellow,
"t.he one with hal~~d ideas."
A distinction could also he drawn between preand post-Revolutionary America.
Prior to the
Revolution, Colonial' governors could banish Puritan
and Quaker clergymen; some Quakers were even
executed for heresy (Tedlill'lJ I !lHfi, :12). As .Justice
Ilugo Black wl'Ote of the period:
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Catholics found themselves hounded and
proscribed because of their fai~h; Quakers who
followed their conscience went to jail. . . .
All of these dissenwrs wCl'e compelled to pay
tithes and taxes lo support governmentsponsored churches whose miniswrs preached
inllammatory sermons designed to strengthen
and consolidate tlw established faith by
generating a burning hat.red against dissenters
(/<~"erson v. /lourd of I~d"etltioll I B4 7, 10).
The Bill of Rights was a positive attempt to cure
these ills, as lwidellced by .Jefferson's fear that the
Constitution
itself did
not
pl'Ovide
adequate
pmwction: "I will now tell you what I do not like.
First. the omission of a bill of rights, providing
clearly, and without the aid of sophism, (illo f.oeedom
of religion, freedom of the press
Ietc!"
(Lipscornh and Bergh I !)O:I-().1, :187).
How the Founding Fat hers sought t~) curl' these
ills has been I he subject of vigorous dcbate.
Zechariah Chafee argues thaI. the framers of t.he
first amendment "inlended I~) wipe out the common
la w of sedition, and make further prosecutions for
CJ"iticism of the government, without any incitement
1.0 law-breaking, filloever impossible in the United
States of America" (I!H I, 21). Levy disagrees, and
"I"Cmains convinced that t.he revolutionary generation
did not seck to wipl' out the cure idea of seditious
libel, t.hat the goveJ"lllllent. may be assaulted by
Illere words, lhat the legislahlJ"s were more
suppressive than the cou.ts, that the freedom of
political expl"Cssioll remained quite narrow until
17H8. . . . " (1!)85, 7ti7L

These two argumcnts characterize my searl'll for
the origin of the First Amentlnwnt protection of free
speech.
Was our fn~e spec(~h conel~ived as "Ihe
matrix, t.he indispensable (~ondilion of nearly every
other (illom of freedom" (I'ulko ". COli JI('d;1" II t I H:I7,
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:1 I B)?
01' did frccdolll of speech evolvc as it did
in I~ngland, as an offshoot of ollter libcrlics as the
laws of sedition, prior rCHtrainl, and liccnsing werc
cl'Oded after the Magna Carla?
Sincc Chal'ce allli Lcvy have alrl'ady lo(~kcd horns
in their examination or First Amelllillwilt hislmoy,
rcl.racing illl'ir sleps would be ml'rilless. I propose
instcad a novel thesis: Is fn'l' speech a natural
right.? II' Ihen' is a nalllloal right. of fn'c spel'{~h, ils
primacy ovcr 01 her liberties not acrordpd that status
is assured. This would support. I hose who espouse
the view I hat free speedl is Ill'cessary to freedom
and tnlC democracy, since these are fundamental to
our happincss and self-realizatioll.
If there is no
natural right t.o floce speech, then it must have
adsen as a residual of eroded protedions of the
state froll) disruption of ordeL

]S THERE A NATURAL LAW
OF (i'REE SPEECH?
The Roman lawyer Cicero staled:
There is in fact a true law - namely, right
reason - which is in accordance with nat.ure,
applies to all men, and is unchangeable and
eternal. . . .
Neither t.he Senate nor the
people can absolve us from our obligat.ions to
obey t.his law, and it requires no Sext.us Aelius
to expound and interpret. it..
It. will not lay
dowll olle rule at. ROIne and another at.
Athens, nor will it. be one rule I~)day and
another tOIlHlITOW. But. there will be olle law,
eternal and unchangeable, binding at all times
upon all peoples; and there will be, as it w(~re,
one common mast.er and ruler or men, namely
Uod, who is the author of this law, it.s
int.erpreter, and it.s spollsor (Wilkin I!H'l, ~~fi-
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2Ii).

The hist.ory of free speedl in Ureece leads us to
reject. any notion that it conformed to the Ciceronian
litmus U!st for natural law. Individual communities
within Greece changer! the enfranchisement of who
could speak and the penalties and conditions of
speech.
As I~ugene nerhart. has not.ed, any
fragment of natural law found in the writings of
ancient Greece is no more "than the recognition of
man's inherent desire fill· reciprocal justice" (Gerhart
195a, 34).
Similarly, for the Romans, nat.ural law belonged
to t.he present, and was defined in terms of their
present institutions (Maine 1931, 70-7 I). The "one
law, eternal and unchangeable" was in fact. a
product. of the reasoning of t.he Roman Rulers,
subject. to change as expediency required. They, like
the Greeks, expanded the enfranchisement of
participants in government, yet exduded a large
population of polit.ical eunuchs from expressing their
opinions.
"In medieval t.imes t.he law of nature and the
law of <tod were regarded as similar" (lerhat·t
I !J5:I, 40).
With Rome as ·t.he cent.er of the
universe, and the Pope t.he final arhit.er of (lod's
laws, successive popes poured out. delTl'lals which
we.·e formed into st.at.ute books. These purposed to
be t.he laws of (lod in rule fill·maL Every law not
in the books was repeated, and "every sent.ence,
every rubric lof the <1regory IX statut.e book I was
law"
(Pollock
and
Maitland
I H~)5,
HH-H~».
lIoldswOlth· not.ed the erred of Uwse laws on secular
rull~rs: "To disobl'Y till' law of God might. mean
excommunication and a king 01' otlll'r rull'r who
deliberately cont.inued t.o defy it might expose his
t.erritory to an int.erdiet." (1 !I22-2H, 21 Hl.
Thus
there arose legal as well as religious grounds for the
revolts of the Jo'ranl"ist"an t.ertiaries of t he period
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who refused t.o bea.· arms for their secular kings
(Fort.ini 1!IH I, 522).
During the Middle Ages however, it would seem
that primitive attempt.s to define and apply natural
law served only as a check on the excesses or
Church legal jurisdiction. The Dominicans used lhe
writings or SL Thomas Aquinas t.o a .... ive essentially
al the Ciceronian definition. Mu(:h like Ulei.· Greek
counterparts however, t.heorists or natural law did
not use it. as a st.arting point in the creation or law,
but as a comfortable justification ror ideas or
abstract justice and "equity," which would grow inlo
a great body of English law.
As Grot.ius put il,
equit.y was "the cOlTectioll of that wherein the law
fby reason of ils unive.'sality' is deficient" (Gerhaa't
J HS:J, 4H).
Gmtius could have drawn li'om the
lesson of t.he Magna Carta. The grant of individual
freedom to I~nglishmcn "evoked immediat.e opposition
and hostility from the papacy," and was seen "as
the result or a conspiracy" (Gerhart 195:l, 4 H).
Thus, despit.e an Aquinan and Dominican legacy or
nat.ural law, the Homan church did nol even
recognize the basic rights of property and trial by
peers, let alone free speech.
The great principles embodied in the Magna
Carta also spulTed the lH'eak of America rrom her
mother country. Writings on the social contract, the
laws governing human understanding, and the
reform or government /ired the imaginalion of the
framers and rormed a basis or "natural righls" the
violation or which was used to justify the rebellion
(Holdsworth 1922-2(3, 15).
The Declaration of
Independence is based on "truths that are sclfevident," that man has "inalienahle right.s."
It is this philosophical (and natural right.s)
t.radition t.hat jurists slI(:h as Brandeis, lIolmes and
Cardozo draw upon when I.IH'Y proted speech,
lIowever, they do so e .... oneously.
The only
prot.ection of free speech (;Ollsistcnl wilh a theory of
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natural law would be absolutism.
.Justice Black's
absolutist thesis is stated in one sentence: "I take
no law abridging to mean flll Law abridging"
(Kudand I !l75, 2).
This is the only positIOn
consistent with free speech and expression being first
among the inalienable rights of man.
Yet, as we
shall see, the absolutist viewpoint has never been
that of United States courts.
After the Revolution, t.he Americans commitlt~d
the sin of enfranchisement limitation: " . . . in spite
of the high sounding generalities of the Declarat.ion
of Independence, \the Americans) did not abandon
the institution of slavery; landl the suffrage in many
of the states was very limited . . . . " (lioidsworth
1922-26, 15-16). The lirst historical limit on speech
was thus imposed --who had the right. Before the
landmark cases resulting fmm the Espionage Act of
I U 17 and Schcflk v. Uflitcd States, numerous
Supreme Court decisions upheld I·estrictions on
speech. Since the Fourt.centh Amendment had not
been extended to include guarantees of the Fi.·st
Amendment against. the stat.es, AntAlIlin Scalia
al·gues that pre-World War One decisions shed light
on what the Court conceived the guarantees of the
First Amendment to be (I US7, 10). An examination
of these cases led Rabban to conclude that "\olnly
a lew, isolated opinions before World War One
indicat.l~d that the First. Amendment wuld be more
than a paper guarantee" (I !lSI, 540 note 2). Scalia
condudes
that Ilw "First Amendment is a
parliculady fragile protection, constantly subject to
assault in. authoritarian times, and tliliS constantly
in need or zealous defense" (I !IS 7, I I).
Scalia is implying that our ClIITent "libertarian"
stance toward freedom of speech is suscept ible of
change.
Threats 10 national security, real or
mispcrceived, have seen tlw Iwavy hand of
authoritarianism slldd(~nl'y desl"l'11I1 to restrict free
speech.
As .JustiCl~ lI"dan said in KOllisbl'rg II.

HO

PI SIGMA ALPHA RgVIEW

Stnie Ilnr, " . . . we reject the vicw that freedom
of speech and association . . . , as protected by t.he
First and Fourtccnt.h Amcndllll'lIts arc 'absolutes'.
Throughout it.s history this Comt has
consistently rccognized at least two way~ in which
const.it.ut.ionally protecl~d freedom of speech is
narrower than an unlimit.ed license t.o t.alk . . . ."
( I un I, 4 B·!iO).
One of these has heen national
security.
Chief.' ustice Vinsoll st.ated in I U!i I:
"Nothing is more cCI'tain in modcrn society than t.he
p.-inciple t.hat. there are no ahsolut.es. . .. To t.hose
[eleven Communist leaders in this inst.ancel who
would paralyze OUI' Government, in the face of
impending threat. by encasing it. in a semanlic sl.-ait
jacket wc must. reply that all COlH'cpts are relativl'"
([)ennis Ii. lIlIitl'd Sl(/tl~s I B!i I, !iOH).

CONCLUSION
Any au,riIJlIt.ion of our First. Amendment right (of
free expression at least) to nat.ural law sulrers from
the same defeds which we aU.rilmlt' t.o the Orel'k
and Roman syst.ems; it is t.il'd t.o our CllITent
insl it.utiolls and valucs. By illfl'I'ence, t.his would·he
natural ";ght is subject to change in scope as ideas
changc and instit.utions shin Ihe balance of their
power. By dcdudion, since t.he law is not. appli(~ahlc
t.o all timcs and all places, or l'Vl'n constant wilhin
t.he limit.ed history of t.he United Slates, there is no
nat.ural law of frel' speech .
•J ustice Cardozo's chal'acterizat.ion of the First
Amendment freedom of expression as being fil'sl
among the first. is a fallacy.
We arc not. uniqul',
bUl a mere extension of our hist.OI'ical pn~deccssors.
Like the Ureeks, we value the preservation of our
democracy above t.he right. of t.hl' individual to speak
his mind. Locke's theories of social nllltrad explain
that. the individual must compromise cert.ain liberties
to aUain greater securit.y of other liherlies.
It.
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would appear that Ihis is the case in Ame/'ica.
Like the I~nglish then, Americans can make a case
that liberty of speech has sprung from the
consolidation and assertion of other liberties, rather
than being the catalyst of thm;e liberties.
The
jurists of the twentieth century who have tried to
attach a special status to speech have CITed in their
philosophical origins.
The framers saw only the
greater dmnonatic freedom envisioned by Locke for
the populace as a whole.
The theory of a self·
realization only aU,ainahle through free expression is
a creation of our modern jurists.
These jUl'isls,
unfettered by the prad ical concerns of our Founding
Fathers, may see a different First Amendment than
did Jefferson.
They may be the great.est natural
rights 'theorisls since the Dominicans.
Jlowever,
history tells us, and Ihe mes~;uge and philosophy of
the Founding Fathers l'onti ... ns, thai reversions to a
state of nature and natural laws of self realization
will inevitably be crushed in any confront.ation with
the pr'inciples of national security and the protection
of democratic order.
Our rel:ent. flirtation with
natu/'al law has served merely to lemporar'ily
redefine when such a confnmtatioll occurs.
III the penultimate analytical sedion of this essay
I put the Greek, Roman, English and Ame.-ican
systems to the litmus lest of Cicenmean natural
law.
The astute observer will have noliced the
absence of a .Jewish Illodel. The .Jewish law, being
based 011 theonat.ic p"illciples, is the nearest to
natural law.
The ultimat.e offense in Israel was
idolatr'y.
Offenses against God were the most
serious, . nol those against the government or t.he
people. Ofli..~nses against the individual were next.
in gravity, since they were regarded as vicarious
sins against God, who had commanded love for one's
neighbor.
A cursory examination of \lw many
prohibitions imposed upon Israeliles may lead us
dismiss their daillls \0 fn'pdolJl 01' spp!'l'h, or III allY
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imJividual rights. I::; it. not. t.he case, however, that
tlll'Y enjoyed the greatest. frcedom of any peoplc'!
The law elevat.cd the pcrson or the individual such
that. the standard of giving offense wa_s anything
less t han love.
Could it he t.hat our present dilY jurist.philosophers convey t.he ambivalence of our American
sodety toward God and the individual'! We st.arted
the American l'epulJlic on the principle of a New
.Jerusalem, covenanted to God to preserve freedom
and democl'acy, then Wll immediately tumed away
fmm the pl'ior-ities we sha,"ed with the old
,Jerusalem. God W,JS not to be p/"()tecl~d. Instead,
the individual was to be pmtecwd in His stead. As
we have refined and expanded the proteclion given
to the individual over two hundred years, we have
elevated the status of t.he individual t.o a level far
below, but perhaps directed t.oward, that which he
held in ancient Israel. While we need not love him,
we must increasingly resped his right. to ad as he
pleases.
The euphoria of this elevat.ion of the individual
to the achievement of his inalienable rights has
intoxicated our philosopher jurists. In canonizing the
individual such that he can achieve a self-I"ealization
and a fulfillment of all other rights, we arc not
legislating the fulfillment of the measure of his
creation.
Cicero mentioned the Senate and the
people as subordinat.es in the natural law.
lie
envisioned
no
Supreme
Court,
uneleded,
unrepresent.at.ive, and incapable of ouster, which
could decree that instead of nod-then-man, "nat.m-al
law" bids us worship man thcn (lod, wit.h t.he lat.ter
optional or it would offend man. The natural law
of OUI' jurists is of tlll'ir own making, and fails to
meet. any definition of natural law rcquiring
eternality and unchangeability.
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